

Winning Before the Fight: An Armed Suasion Approach to Countering Near Peer Competition

A Monograph

by

Ms. Caroline M. Byorick
Defense Intelligence Agency



School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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14. ABSTRACT Near peer competitors possess both the will and capability to oppose US interests and constrict US military freedom of action, as well as strategic, often nuclear, capabilities that create options to escalate beyond conventional combat. US joint doctrine currently provides little guidance on how to arrange military actions short of armed conflict in order to counter near peer competition. This monograph analyzes decades of coercive literature to identify the components and structures of coercive strategies, and several iterations of joint doctrine, in order to explore how the US Department of Defense previously approached this challenge. This monograph hypothesizes that joint doctrine would benefit from the inclusion of a coercive strategy called 'armed suasion'. It proposes a planning construct to provide military planners a way to arrange deterring, compelling, and inducing military actions short of conflict to build credibility, shape near peer competitor decision-making, and manage the risk of unintended escalation. This monograph also proposes a tailored set of principles, separate from the principles of joint operations, which allow a planning staff to achieve success while managing tensions that could escalate to armed conflict. These proposals are tested against a contemporary case study on Chinese action in the South China Sea. The monograph concludes by noting that developing armed suasion planning constructs will address some of the challenges common to implementing coercive strategies, resulting in better communicated and coordinated plans for countering the aggressive actions of near peer competitors before armed conflict emerges.
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Name of Candidate: Ms. Caroline M. Byorick

Monograph Title: Winning Before the Fight: An Armed Suasion Approach to Countering Near Peer Competition

Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Patricia J Blocksome, MA

_____, Seminar Leader
Robert L. Smith, COL

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
James C. Markert, COL

Accepted this 25th day of May 2017 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Prisco R. Hernandez, PhD

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Abstract

Winning Before the Fight: An Armed Suasion Approach to Countering Near Peer Competition,
by Ms. Caroline M. Byorick, DIA, 42 pages.

Near peer competitors possess both the will and capability to oppose US interests and constrict US military freedom of action. They also have strategic, often nuclear, capabilities that create options to escalate beyond conventional combat in the event of armed conflict. The risk of escalation during armed conflict reduces US options for action; more options exist for countering near peer competition short of combat operations, using a coercive strategy. However, US joint doctrine currently provides little guidance on how to arrange military actions short of armed conflict in order to counter near peer competition. This monograph analyzes decades of coercive literature to identify the components and structures of coercive strategies, and several iterations of joint doctrine, in order to explore how the US Department of Defense approached this challenge in the past. This monograph hypothesizes that joint doctrine would benefit from the inclusion of a type of coercive strategy called armed suasion. This monograph proposes an armed suasion planning construct that provides military planners a way to arrange deterring, compelling, and inducing military actions short of conflict to build credibility, shape near peer competitor decision-making, and manage the risk of unintended escalation. To guide the planning construct, this monograph also proposes a tailored set of principles, separate from the principles of joint operations, which allow a planning staff to balance achieving success with managing tensions that could escalate to armed conflict. These proposals are tested against a contemporary case study on Chinese action in the South China Sea. The monograph concludes by noting that developing armed suasion planning constructs will address some of the challenges common to implementing coercive strategies, resulting in better communicated and coordinated plans for countering the aggressive actions of near peer competitors before armed conflict emerges.

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Acronyms

Air Defense Identification Zone	ADIZ
Freedom of Navigation	FON
Joint Publication	JP
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	NATO
Near Peer Competitor	NPC
Operations Other Than War	OOTW
Precision Guided Munition	PGM
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons	NPT
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense	THAAD
Theater Campaign Plan	TCP
US Pacific Command	USPACOM

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Introduction

...The normal results that emerge at the level of grand strategy are not those of war but of “armed suasion” as I call it. They are no less substantial for the absence of any visible clash of arms, for armed suasion is nothing less than power, or more precisely that portion of the power of states that derives from their military strength.

—Edward Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*

The US Department of Defense faces a pressing requirement to meet rising threats to US interests from nations with both the intention and capability to oppose the United States.¹

Language in the 2013 iteration of Joint Publication (JP) 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, and the 2017 iteration of JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, reflects this requirement. These JPs acknowledge the threat posed by rising peers, the need to counter potential competitors below a level of hostility that might trigger armed conflict, and, where possible, move closer to areas of cooperation and peaceful relations.² Yet from the relative parity between the United States and a near peer competitor, a paradox emerges: the freedom of action the United States enjoys to shape the decisions of other nations is constrained by the risk of escalation by an opponent with more options than submission. Current joint doctrine describes a variety of non-combat activities but offers too little guidance on how to leverage them to shape a near peer competitor’s decision-making process short of armed conflict.

This monograph argues that the Department of Defense can fill select gaps in joint doctrine by including “armed suasion,” a type of coercive strategy adapted from theorist Edward Luttwak.³ A major component of this coercive strategy is an armed suasion planning construct

¹ Written Statement for the Record, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis before the Senate Appropriations Committee—Defense, 115th Cong., March 22, 2017,¹ accessed March 25, 2017, <https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/032218-Secretary-Mattis-Testimony.pdf>.

² Joint Publication (JP) 1-0, *Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), I-10; Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), VI-2.

³ Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 218.

that serves as an overarching framework by which to arrange non-combat military actions in a zone of competition already described in joint doctrine, as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. The Conflict Continuum. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), VI-2.

Armed suasion is defined here as an arrangement of deterring, compelling, and inducing military actions within the competition zone, short of armed conflict. This arrangement allows the United States, as the challenger, to build, maintain, or regain credibility; shape near peer competitor decision making; and manage risk of escalation to conflict. The armed suasion planning construct also uses a set of principles separate from, though related to, the principles of joint operations to guide military planners to think differently about how they use military action to counter a near peer competitor when avoiding armed conflict is a policy objective.

This monograph's proposal for armed suasion rests on several arguments. First, it argues that the prospect of armed conflict against a near peer competitor comes with risk of escalation to nuclear use. A military commander actually has more military options to counter such a competitor before conflict than he or she does once significant combat operations begin. Second, it argues that any coercive strategy, to include the armed suasion planning construct, should include deterrent military action, compellent military action, and positive military inducements. This provides a military commander a greater range of options than would the more purely deterrent approach suggested by the language in joint doctrine. Third, it argues that while joint doctrine provides a detailed accounting of the types of military operations available short of conflict—including deterrence—implementing those operations using only current principles of joint operations carries a greater risk of escalation to conflict. Early iterations of joint doctrine used a separate set of principles for operations other than war; that earlier set provided a useful foundation for the principles of armed suasion proposed by this monograph.

Armed suasion, as conceived here, is explicitly an exercise in military power. This monograph generally avoids discussion on how armed suasion fits into other US government agency activities like diplomatic engagement or economic measures such as trade deals or sanctions. However, consistent with joint doctrine, it would be a military line of effort within a whole-of-government strategy to shape a near peer competitor's decision making process. Armed suasion can be used to shape any competitor's decision making process. However, armed suasion's greatest value emerges in use with peer or near peer competitors, because their military capabilities pose significantly greater risks to the United States and its allies should hostility escalate to armed conflict. Whether alone or with other instruments of national power, an armed suasion approach creates opportunities to defend and pursue US interests in the face of opposition of near peer competitors who perceive their interests as different from those of the United States. In doing so, armed suasion creates chances for the United States to successfully pursue its national security objectives—to win—before a fight becomes necessary.

Key Concepts and Terms

In making a case for the value of armed suasion, this monograph relies on several key concepts. The first is near peer competitor, the specific category of actor with which this monograph is concerned. The second is armed conflict, a commonly used term with practically no definitional agreement. The third is conflict continuum, a concept found in US joint military doctrine for which armed conflict and armed suasion are just points on a spectrum. The fourth is coercive strategies, a large category of activities whereby one actor attempts to influence the actions of another. Three types of coercive actions this monograph discusses are deterrence, compellence, and inducement.

Near Peer Competitors

On the international stage, actors play different roles over time. Today's adversaries can become tomorrow's friends and vice-versa. Moreover, no two states are alike, coming to the stage with unique histories, culture, and beliefs about the world and their place in it. This monograph focuses on the generic category of near peer competitor (NPC) rather than any specific state. It mentions contemporary near peer nations by name only for illustration, including China's island building in the South China Sea as an illustrative case by which to conduct a doctrinal test of the hypothesis for armed suasion.

The term near peer competitor frequently appears in US defense-related news and discussions, yet a practical definition is elusive. JP 1-0 recognizes the potential for traditional conflict with emerging peer competitors," but does not define what makes this kind of state different from the rest of the world's nation-states.⁴ RAND Corporation provides a solid foundation in its 2001 definition of peer competitors:

...a state or collection of challengers with the power and motivation to confront the United States on a global scale in a sustained way and to a sufficient level where the

⁴ JP 1-0, I-10.

ultimate outcome of a conflict is in doubt even if the United States marshals its resources in an effective and timely manner.⁵

Drawing from RAND's definition of peer competitors, this monograph defines an NPC by three characteristics. First, the NPC has sufficient sustainable combat power and motivation to successfully confront the United States regionally, not globally. An NPC's extra-regional reach would not be sustainable in the face of a US buildup of combat power. One might think the United States, with its demonstrably global reach and years-long sustainment capability, would simply push through an NPC's limited reach and sustainability. However, the United States' overwhelming capability paradoxically increases threat by creating in the NPC the perception that it will have to reach for more powerful tools in its war chest to secure victory or stave off defeat—nuclear weapons and strategic conventional weapons like certain offensive cyber capabilities, counter space capabilities, ballistic missile defenses, and hypersonic weapons.⁶

Armed Conflict

Armed conflict is a synonym for war; joint doctrine uses the terms interchangeably, while also recognizing distinctions between them.⁷ This monograph generally uses armed conflict because the United States has not declared war since 1942; the exceptions are for certain phrases

⁵ The RAND report notes it bases its own definition on a contemporary Department of Defense definition, though no citation is provided. This monograph speculates the authors are referring to the 2001 iteration of Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, which describes the challenge posed by 'potential opponents' with "large, modern conventional military forces" to US military commanders attempting to deter conflict or win if conflict is joined. See Thomas S Szayna et al., *The Emergence of Peer Competitors: A Framework for Analysis* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 7, accessed November 1, 2016, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1346.html; Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), I-1.

⁶ Luttwak, *Strategy*, 229; *Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 114th Cong., February 9, 2016, 3:9, accessed March 5, 2017, <https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/16-02-09-worldwide-threats>; Bates Gill et al., "Deterrent Effect," *Foreign Policy*, October 5, 2012, accessed March 5, 2017, foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/05/deterrent-effect/; Will Edwards and Luke Penn-Hall, "The Rise of Hypersonic Weapons," *The Cipher Brief*, October 5, 2016, accessed March 5, 2017, <http://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/rise-hypersonic-weapons-1095>.

⁷ JP 1-0, I-21.

like principles of war.⁸ Wars are formal constructs, at least in the Western tradition; Nation A delivers a formal notification of its intent to Nation B before initiating hostilities. Yet, one nation can conduct combat operations against another without a formal declaration. This can be seen in the discussions of the framers of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, who were particularly concerned with nations conducting warfare against other states without a war declaration, while arguing the use of force was “police action, or...legitimate self-defence.”⁹

The Geneva Conventions attempted to eliminate these distinctions and close potentially large gaps in coverage by adopting the term “armed conflict.” This new term described any “difference arising between two States...leading to the intervention of armed forces.”¹⁰ However, in eliminating one problem, another emerged: lack of an agreed upon set of criteria between nations for scope, intensity, or duration that indicate when a state of armed conflict has been reached.¹¹ The lack of consensus in defining armed conflict—when it begins, when it ends, what activities count as part of the fighting—spills into the United States’ joint doctrine.

The Conflict Continuum

Joint doctrine addresses issues of scope, intention, and intensity in its concept of a conflict continuum.¹² The conflict continuum measures out a space that starts out cooperative, changes to competitive, and ends with hostility. As seen in Figure 1, war is just an act or stage of

⁸ Senate Historical Office, "Official Declarations of War by Congress," The US Senate, accessed March 9, 2017, https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/WarDeclarationsbyCongress.htm.

⁹ Mary Ellen O'Connell, "Defining Armed Conflict," Notre Dame Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-09 (Winter 2008): 4, accessed March 5, 2017, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1392211.

¹⁰ Ibid., 4.

¹¹ Ibid., 5.

¹² JP 3-0, 2017, V-4.

hostility along this continuum. This illustration, which is new to the 2017 iteration of JP 3-0, updates previous versions of the conflict continuum with more detail on the nature and goal of military actions outside armed conflict; a pre-conflict recognition of competitors and potential adversaries; and its relationship to large-scale combat operations. In this conceptualization of a conflict continuum, armed suasion would be a coercive strategy executed in the competition zone.

Coercive Strategies and Actions

Deterrence theorist Lawrence Freedman defines a coercive strategy as involving “the purposive use of overt threats of force to influence another’s strategic choices.”¹³ Deterrence, as defined in joint doctrine, is the most widely known type of coercive strategy. Armed suasion, as this monograph defines the term, is a type of coercive strategy in which deterrent actions are one element. Coercive action begins when one nation issues a threat to another nation. When discussing the conceptual structures of coercive threats this monograph refers to the actor that issues any type of coercive threat as the challenger or sender and refers to the object of the threat as the target or recipient.¹⁴ Coercive strategies exist outside the military instrument of power; economic sanctions, for example, are a common form of coercive strategy, often implemented in concert with other coercive actions. For clarity and consistency, this monograph will generally

¹³ Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004), 26.

¹⁴ In deterrence literature, the actor issuing a coercive threat in defense of the status quo is called the defender while the actor challenging the status quo is called the challenger. With compellence, the actor issuing a coercive threat to compel a change to the status quo is more typically called the challenger while the object of the threat is called the target. See, Freedman, *Deterrence*, 27; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable,” *World Politics* 42, no. 3 (Apr., 1990): 336, accessed September 29, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010415>; Todd S. Sechser, “Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918-2001,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 4 (2011): 380, accessed December 12, 2016, <http://faculty.virginia.edu/tsechser/Sechser-CMPS-2011.pdf>; Timothy M. Peterson and A. Cooper Drury, “Sanctioning Violence: The Effect of Third-Party Economic Coercion on Militarized Conflict,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, no. 4 (August 2011): 580, accessed March 26, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23049902>.

refer to coercive strategies, theories, and actions in reference to the many variations of coercive behavior that are often bundled under the term deterrence.

Deterrence

Deterrence attempts to protect a status quo.¹⁵ Deterrent actions seek to prevent a target from taking action the challenger does not want it to take by presenting a “credible threat of unacceptable counteraction” that raises the cost of the anticipated act beyond the “perceived benefits.”¹⁶ In other words, deterrence attempts to make the threat recipient unwilling to act for fear of the consequences. There are two basic forms of deterrence: deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial.

Deterrence by punishment is credibly threatening sufficient penalties such that the target judges pursuing the objective would not be worth the consequences.¹⁷ For example, the challenger uses the credible threat of a nuclear response to a nuclear strike, or even overwhelming conventional force to prompt the target to weigh achieving its objective against the ruin of its military forces, industries, or cities.¹⁸ Deterrence by denial works by creating sufficient barriers between the target and its desired objective that the target judges it is unlikely to achieve its goal.¹⁹ For example, US forces stationed in South Korea provide deterrence by denial, with North Korea as the recipient of the deterrent message.

¹⁵ Sechser, "Militarized Compellent Threats," 378.

¹⁶ JP 3-0, 2017, VI-4.

¹⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 14-15; Freedman, *Deterrence*, 36-37; Luttwak, *Strategy*, 226-227.

¹⁸ Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, 15.

¹⁹ Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, 14-15; Freedman, *Deterrence*, 36-37; Luttwak, *Strategy*, 226-227.

Compellence

Compellence seeks to change the status quo, even if the desire is to return to a previous status quo that the target changed first.²⁰ Strategist Thomas Schelling coined the term compellence in his 1966 book, *Arms and Influence*, to describe “the threat that...requires that the punishment be administered *until* the other acts, rather than *if* he acts.”²¹ Compellence is different from deterrence in that compellence seizes the initiative—the challenger acts first by threatening and if necessary administering punishment until the target takes responsive action that aligns with the challenger’s preferences.²²

Inducements

Whereas deterrent and compellent activities attempt to eliminate some of the competitor’s options, inducements are activities designed to give the competitor options. Inducements should be consistent with the challenger’s desired goals yet appealing to the competitor. The inducement also should allow the competitor to save face on the international, but especially domestic, stage. Multiple deterrence theorists agree that inducements are a critical yet often overlooked element of coercive strategies.²³

Literature Review: A Very, Very Brief History of Coercive Theory

Coercive theories—specifically, deterrence theory—emerged after the United States first used nuclear weapons in 1945. Coercive literature proliferated during the Cold War as the Soviet

²⁰ Sechser, "Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918-2001," 378, 381.

²¹ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence, With a New Preface and Afterword* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 70.

²² Ibid., 70.

²³ Alexander George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1991), 10; Stephen J. Cimbala, *Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 2; Freedman, *Deterrence*, 56-57.

Union built its own nuclear arsenal. Lawrence Freedman notes that after three waves of deterrence theory, “the end of the cold war appeared to bring the debate on deterrence to a juddering halt.”²⁴ In conducting a review of scholarly books and journals written between 1950 and 2017, this monograph reaches a different conclusion.²⁵ It is true that, with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the quantity of literature on traditional deterrence theory greatly diminished. However, scholarly thought on the elements of coercive strategies—including but increasingly not limited to deterrence—continued.

The United States and its allies encountered numerous emerging security concerns that are reflected in the coercive literature of the 1990s. Issues included the crisis surrounding North Korea’s 1993 withdrawal from the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); armed conflict between the newly independent states of the former Yugoslavia; and the emerging nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan.²⁶ Deterring terrorist acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction—biological and chemical, as well as loose nukes from Soviet stockpiles presented another security concern.²⁷ Outside the realm of military power, literature

²⁴ Freedman, *Deterrence*, 23.

²⁵ To acquire a sense of changes to coercion literature over time, this monograph conducted a search of books and journals in JSTOR. The methodology searched abstracts using the following terms: deterrence/deterrent; compellence/compellent; coercive diplomacy; and active deterrence. Additionally, the search focus was limited to material contained within the subjects of peace and conflict studies, and political science. For the period of 1950-2000, the monograph reviewed titles from 1950-1960, 1990-1992, 1995, and 1998-2000. For the period of 2001-2010, the monograph reviewed titles from 2001-2002, 2005, and 2008-2010. For the period of 2011-2017, this monograph reviewed titles for each year. Illustrative examples of themes in coercive theory are cited in the footnotes.

²⁶ Joel S. Wit, Poneman, Daniel B., and Robert L. Gallucci, *Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 26-28; Peter Andreas, *Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 1; George Perkovich, “Nuclear Proliferation,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 112 (Autumn, 1998): 12-13, accessed March 11, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149032>; Iftikhar H. Malik, “A Nuclearised South Asia: View from the Other Side,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 33, no. 22 (May 30 - Jun. 5, 1998): 1304, accessed March 26, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4406824>.

²⁷ Richard K. Betts, “The New Threat of mass Destruction,” *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 1 (Jan-Feb 1998): 32-33, accessed March 11, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20048360>.

appears discussing the use and consequences of economic tools as an element of coercive strategy.²⁸

Many of the security concerns of the 1990s continued into the first two decades of the 21st century, even as new concerns emerged and created additional branches of scholarly thought on coercive strategies. With regards to military capabilities, themes include cyber activity, ballistic missile defenses, and long-range precision strike.²⁹ Deterring a nuclear Iran came to the fore, as did the implications of Chinese military modernization on potential coercive strategies.³⁰ Traditional deterrence themes, particularly as related to Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), returned with Russia's conflict with Georgia, annexation of Crimea, 2014 intervention in Syria, and US-assessed violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.³¹

²⁸ Peterson and Drury, "Sanctioning Violence," 580.

²⁹ Martin C. Libicki, *Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), xvi, accessed March 26, 2017, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG877.html>; James M. Acton, *Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), 98, accessed March 26, 2017, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf>; Stefanie von Hlatky and Andreas Wenger, *The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO, and Beyond* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015); Bruce Klingner, "The Importance of THAAD Missile Defense," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 29, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2015): 21-41, accessed March 26, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org.lumen.cgsccarl.com/stable/43685234>.

³⁰ Brenda Shaffer, "Iran at the Nuclear Threshold," *Arms Control Today* 33, no. 9 (November 2003): 7-12, accessed March 26, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org.lumen.cgsccarl.com/stable/23626796>; Michael Chase and Arthur Chan, *China's Evolving Approach to "Integrated Strategic Deterrence"* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), vii-viii, accessed March 26, 2017, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1366.html.

³¹ Andrew A. Michta and Paal Sigurd Hilde, *The Future of NATO: Regional Defense and Global Security* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2014) accessed March 26, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org.lumen.cgsccarl.com/stable/10.3998/mpub.6980805>; *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, 7, 17-18.

Schools of Coercive Thought: Deterrence versus Compellence

The modern body of work revisiting deterrence as practiced between the United States and a peer competitor is unsurprisingly small compared to that generated during the Cold War. As a result, this monograph relied primarily on material written in the Cold War and 1990s to develop its hypothesis for implementing armed suasion against a near peer competitor. Like deterrence, armed suasion is a type of coercive strategy described in Cold War deterrence theory. As Lawrence Freedman notes, all variants of deterrence theory explore “setting boundaries for actions and establishing the risks associated with the crossing of those boundaries.”³² How a nation should effectively set and enforce boundaries, specifically through the use of military power, drives many of the differences in schools of coercion that emerged in the Cold War period. A way to understand coercive strategies is along a spectrum from purely passive, preventative deterrence, to active deterrence, to the threat or use of military power to compel a change in another nation’s behavior. Many differences between coercion schools hinge on questions regarding the degree to which a nation should use the threat of military force to deter or compel a competitor’s actions. Three basic schools of coercive thought relevant to this monograph lie on different points along this spectrum.

While most deterrence theorists recognize deterrence and compellence as two basic categories of coercive action, the first school of theorists assert a challenger’s threat of military power works most effectively when used to prevent the recipient from acting against the challenger’s interests.³³ Bernard Brodie, one of the original deterrence theorists, falls into this camp, writing as he did in the immediate aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and subsequent development of thermonuclear weapons.³⁴ The second theorist school argues that, even in the

³² Freedman, *Deterrence*, 116.

³³ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 69-71; Freedman, *Deterrence*, 26; Luttwak, *Strategy*, 218.

³⁴ Freedman, *Deterrence*, 20-21; George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 7.

nuclear age, the threat or use of military power can be used to compel a target to act against its own perceived interests. Thomas Schelling arguably is the most prominent of these theorists.³⁵ A practical point in the favor of the second group is the fact that there is no exclusivity in armed suasion—what makes an action deterrent or compellent is not the nature of the activity but the intent of the challenger and the context of the operational environment.³⁶ As discussed in detail below, an action can start out as a deterrent and transition to a compellent. The permeable nature of deterrent and compellent actions create challenges in use, because deterrent and compellent actions operate according to different structures.³⁷

To illustrate the structures of deterrence and compellence, imagine a hypothetical scenario in which one state—the challenger—observes the regime of another state—the target—engaged in a civil war and worries the target may use chemical weapons against the rebelling forces or civilians.³⁸ The challenger issues a deterrent threat: the target must refrain from chemical weapons use (challenger defense of a status quo) or the challenger will destroy the target’s chemical weapons sites. If the target upholds the status quo by refraining from chemical weapons use, the challenger might assume the deterrent threat worked.

If instead the target uses chemical weapons, the challenger must then act on the threat and destroy chemical weapon sites in order to maintain credibility. The punishment is administered as a result of the target’s past behavior, not as a contingency of the target’s future behavior. What

³⁵ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 70-71; Freedman, *Deterrence*, 109.

³⁶ Lebow and Stein, “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable,” 352.

³⁷ Todd S. Sechser, "Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918-2001," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 4 (2011), 378-379, accessed December 11, 2016, <http://faculty.virginia.edu/tsechser/Sechser-CMPS-2011.pdf>; Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 70.

³⁸ This thought experiment was inspired by Sara Bjerg Moller’s blog post on the difference between deterrence and compellence in the context of the United States’ response to the Assad regime’s chemical weapons use in the Syrian civil war. See Sara Bjerg Moller, “So Which Is It? Deterrence or Compellence?” *Political Violence at a Glance: Expert Analysis on Violence and Its Alternatives*, August 28, 2013, accessed December 5, 2016, <https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2013/08/28/so-which-is-it-deterrence-or-compellence/>.

the target chooses to do in the future is irrelevant, even though the goal in administering the promised punishment is to coerce the target into accepting future deterrent threats at face value.

The key words in a deterrent threat or action are if and then.

Altering the scenario slightly, imagine the target has a chemical weapons program but has not initiated chemical weapons use, yet the challenger judges the target's chemical weapons capability as an unacceptable status quo. The challenger issues a threat to blockade any ships attempting to enter or leave the target's ports until the target verifiably destroys its chemical weapons program. This is a purely compellent threat; the challenger is not defending the status quo; instead, the challenger has identified a desired end state requiring a change in the target's behavior and committed itself both to acting first—establishing the blockade—and maintaining the act until it achieves the desired outcome. In real world practice, this threat structure often emerges when the target has already changed the status quo and the challenger seeks to deter further change. The key term in a compellent threat or action is until.

In a final alteration to the scenario, imagine that the target uses chemical weapons. In response to that use, the challenger notifies the target that the challenger will destroy chemical weapon sites until the target verifiably destroys its chemical weapons program. In using chemical weapons, the target has changed the status quo. Now the challenger wants the status quo to change again in a way that aligns with the challenger's policy preference, in this case restoring an environment where the regime is deterred from using chemical weapons. The punishment—destruction of chemical weapon sites—is administered as a consequence of the target's previous actions but is also a compellent threat because the execution and duration of the punishment becomes contingent on a change in the target's future behavior.³⁹ In a hybrid deterrent/compellent threat or action, one sees if/then and until.

³⁹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 77.

These illustrative scenarios demonstrate two key issues. First, there are rarely sharp distinctions between a deterrent action and compellent action; a fluid, evolving operational environment frequently determines whether the United States uses its military power to deter, compel, or both.⁴⁰ Second, compellent and hybrid threats and actions require the challenger to demonstrate up front the credibility of the challenger's commitment. Because credibility is more visibly and immediately at stake, compellents and hybrids also require the challenger to have planned in advance what it will do if the recipient does not comply—the until in compellent threats requires additional thought on what next. Actions with a compellent component come with greater risk than purely deterrent ones—greater, earlier risk to the challenger of losing credibility, and greater risk of escalation if the target perceives its domestic and international standing requires a demonstration of its own commitment to fight.⁴¹

Schools of Coercive Thought: The Many Challenges of Coercive Strategies

Coercive strategies—including armed suasion—come with numerous challenges; the third school of coercive thought questions the value of coercive strategies at all, given the risk of escalation associated with coercive strategies that do not address or cannot overcome these challenges. Theorists in this school, including Alexander George, Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, and Stephen Cimbala, prefer greater emphasis on non-military forms of coercion or persuasion.⁴² They examine real-life efforts to conduct coercive strategies—whether called passive and active deterrence, coercive diplomacy, or other terms—and cautioned that any success in implementing such strategies requires overcoming a variety of challenges.

⁴⁰ Cimbala, *Military Persuasion*, 170; Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 77.

⁴¹ Phil Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United States* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 3-4.

⁴² Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 287; Stephen J. Cimbala, *Military Persuasion*, 2; Robert Jervis et al., *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 3.

Common challenges include building credibility; clearly communicating with the threat recipient and accurately interpreting the recipient's response; effectively timing threats; and developing a mix of threats and inducements tailored to the threat recipient's unique circumstances.

The Challenge of Establishing, Maintaining, or Regaining Credibility

Credibility—the will and ability to act—drives successful coercion, and this monograph argues that credibility is a resource that must be sustained.⁴³ As resources, neither will nor ability are fixed or limitless; therefore, US credibility is not static but situational. In armed suasion, building and sustaining credibility to counter a near peer competitor (NPC) comes with several risks. One risk is the paradox of use. Arguably, the United States should seek to employ some military capabilities in order establish their credibility of future willingness to use those capabilities. For example, US military operations in Iraq in 2003 demonstrated both the nature of the capabilities and the willingness to use them; Operation Iraqi Freedom played a large part in the Libyan renouncement of its weapons of mass destruction program.⁴⁴ On the other hand, when capability use results in culmination, or even perceived culmination, credibility may be diminished. The credible threat of future use becomes tied to the time and resources needed to replenish the currently employed capability.⁴⁵

When confronting NPCs armed with nuclear weapons and strategic conventional weapons, credibility faces a second set of paradoxes.⁴⁶ Given that the nonpareil threat of nuclear

⁴³ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 36-37; Freedman, *Deterrence*, 51-52; Luttwak, *Strategy*, 218-219.

⁴⁴ Karl P. Mueller, ed., *Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 12, accessed December 9, 2016, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR676.html.

⁴⁵ Popular support for military action arguably also grows and diminishes with time and use. For both US policymakers and a near peer competitor, trying to gauge US popular support for military use will almost certainly be dependent on the nature of the operation and larger strategic context, and the degree to which each side perceives the US public is fatigued with US military operations.

⁴⁶ Luttwak, *Strategy*, 228-229.

weapons use hangs over nuclear-armed competitors, overwhelming credibility in one domain could trigger an NPC to preemptively escalate to a higher stage of hostility. This paradox suggests that a patchwork of coercive threats, all of which have inadequacies but are backed by the credible threat of nuclear use, might create enough of a sense of conventional parity to reduce the NPC's threat perceptions.⁴⁷

These paradoxes have clear implications for planning armed suasion against an NPC. If the United States ties up or culminates military capabilities pursuing other policy objectives—military operations against rogue states or large-scale counter-terror efforts, for example—the NPC might recalculate its perception of the United States' current ability to coerce it. On the other hand, the NPC might perceive in the United States' lack of available capability greater potential for the United States to rapidly escalate in compensation.⁴⁸ Thinking through both how the United States builds and uses credibility, and how the NPC perceives US credibility, may allow planners to identify areas where armed suasion efforts might be less credible—or too credible—and to develop mitigation measures.

The Challenge of Timing Threats

Issuing military threats—whether implied or explicit—is a core function of armed suasion. How the challenger times the communication and execution of those threats influences the credibility armed suasion builds or loses. Understanding the difference between deterrence and compellence assumes importance here, because time plays a different role for the former than for the latter. In deterrence, there is no penalty for the time that lapses between the issuance of the

⁴⁷ Luttwak, *Strategy*, 228-229.

⁴⁸ Cimbala provides an example of this in the Korean War, noting “The deterrent threat against further North Korean or Chinese escalation was posed in part by the availability of American and other forces that were prepared to continue fighting, and in part by the possible expansion of the war into other theaters of operation and by the US potential use of tactical nuclear weapons.” His source for this is: Richard K Betts. See Cimbala, *Military Persuasion*, 171; Richard K Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), 31-47.

threat and the when the target transitions from inaction to action.⁴⁹ Quite the opposite: if the target never crosses the line drawn, the challenger could claim a deterrence victory no matter what factors influenced the target’s decision to not act. It is when a deterrent threat fails that timing becomes an issue: punishment must be enacted and the longer the delay in acting on the threat, the larger the credibility loss for the challenger.

Timing is more important with a compelling threat, with credibility on the line not just once, but twice. The first credibility challenge is accurately timing the lapse between issuing the threat and punishing the target for not acting. Too little time lapse degrades credibility; if the target perceives the compelling threat to be simply a façade for punishment, it has little incentive to comply. Alternately, letting too much time pass before commencing with punishment risks communicating lack of commitment to the threat recipient.⁵⁰ The second timing challenge begins once the recipient has accepted compellence and begun to act against its own will to stop the punishment. It needs enough—but not too much—time to complete whatever action it has been compelled to take. If the target does not comply by the timeframe established, a new problem presents itself: the compelling measure has not achieved the desired effect. At this point, the challenger’s options are to abandon the compellence effort or give the recipient more time—both of which risk undermining credibility—or apply more compelling pressure. More compelling pressure could maintain or increase the challenger’s credibility, but risks increasing the target’s threat perceptions and the potential for an escalation of hostilities.

The Challenge of Communication

In laying out the challenge of timing threats, a third challenge to implementing effective armed suasion becomes apparent—the challenge of communication through both words and

⁴⁹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 72.

⁵⁰ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 72.

actions.⁵¹ This monograph argues that any communication is a two-part transaction—the sender transmits but the transaction is not complete until the recipient receives. In armed suasion, this seemingly simple interaction has multiple challenges. The sender—a military commander and his or her planning staff—must understand the national policy as related both to the recipient and the specific issue in order to choose actions that are consistent with the policy. The sender must identify all the actions that count as communication in order to create a coherent overall message. Critically, both the sender and recipient must understand the message the same way.

Communication is like dropping rocks into a pond in an attempt to create ripples – messages – that reach someone on the other side. Like waves, messages become less clear as they travel away from the point of origin. Waves are subject to constructive and destructive interference; if a person throws multiple rocks into the pond, simultaneously or sequentially, the waves grow or shrink depending on how they interact. This, too, is like communication, where multiple actions can amplify the message or dampen it.

What counts as communication? Clearly formal messages do, including speeches, memoranda, agreements, and diplomatic interactions. The 2011 iteration of JP 3-0 acknowledged some military operations are communications, noting that military commanders “can simultaneously conduct joint operations with different military end states,” requiring military commanders to work with “other departments and agencies to best integrate military actions with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power in unified action.”⁵² This monograph argues that all military actions, not just joint operations, are communications. For example, the United States has many channels through which communication can occur. Each Combatant Command is a channel of communications, as are its activities in any given

⁵¹ Richard Ned Lebow, “Conclusions,” in *Psychology and Deterrence*, ed Richard Ned Lebow (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 204-205.

⁵² JP 3-0, 2011, V-2—V-3.

domain, including land, sea, air, space, cyber, and information. Each service is a channel—the United States communicates its perception of the security landscape through the ways in which the services organize, train and equip their forces. By this argument, when the United States conducts any military action, from research and development, to training and equipping, to plans and operations, it is transmitting some kind of communication—intended or not—to the NPC.

Widening the communications aperture to include all military actions complicates messaging coercive threats. First, it forces the planner to consider how a vastly wider set of activities contributes to or undermines the central message. Second, the commander and planning staff must judge whether the contributions amplify or dampen the central message, and if the message is becoming too amplified or too damped. The planner must have a sense of which channels of communication the NPC is paying attention to, and how it prioritizes those channels; all acts are communication but not all communications have the same impact.

The Challenge of Interpreting the Target's Response

A fourth, even greater challenge presents itself in interpreting the target's response. Freedman notes how easy it is for communication to go awry between challenger and target, because of bounded rationality inarticulateness, confusion, military signals that are “often notoriously ambiguous...and the psychological intensity of a crisis.⁵³ Three common assumptions underlie the communication of threats in armed suasion, all of which contribute to the challenge of accurately gauging the target’s response.

First is the assumption that the competitor will understand that the challenger’s actions—including verbal statements—communicate a threat to the competitor.⁵⁴ A second, related assumption is that, assuming the threat is accurately received, the competitor will understand

⁵³ Freedman, *Deterrence*, 28-29.

⁵⁴ Freedman, *Deterrence*, 28-29; Robert Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat,” in *Psychology and Deterrence*, ed Richard Ned Lebow (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 31.

what specific acts it either must avoid or must conduct to prevent the challenger from following through on the deterrent or compellent threat. Robert Jervis illustrates these assumptions with an example from the McKinley administration, which attempted to increase “the pressure on Spain in the dispute over Cuba in 1898.”⁵⁵ President McKinley included a semi-ultimatum to Spain in an address to Congress; the Spanish government received and analyzed the message but did not flag “McKinley’s warning of ‘other and further action’ in the ‘near future.’” Instead, Jervis notes the Spanish cabinet found the message satisfactory, in part because it contained language the Spanish government perceived as favorable to the Spanish position.⁵⁶

Logically, a third assumption presumes that, out of all the actions the challenger initiates to achieve various different goals, the competitor will correctly recognize which of those actions constitutes the threat-set for the competitor.⁵⁷ The United States’ ballistic missile defense illustrates the challenge. The United States is deploying the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system to South Korea to counter North Korean missiles, yet Chinese and Russian responses to the THAAD deployment suggest these two countries perceive the deployment as targeting them.⁵⁸

A planner of armed suasion must also consider the possibility that the receiver’s response may be unclear. If the challenger draws a line in the sand and the recipient crosses it, one must contemplate the possibility that the recipient did so deliberately, under conditions it judged to be most opportune. In doing so, the recipient may be communicating its assessment of the

⁵⁵ Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat,” 28-29.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 28-29.

⁵⁷ Freedman, *Deterrence*, 47-48.

⁵⁸ DoD News, Defense Media Activity, “US to Deploy THAAD Missile Battery to South Korea,” U.S. Department of Defense, July 8, 2016, accessed April 10, 2017, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/831630/us-to-deploy-thaad-missile-battery-to-south-korea>; Joshua Berlinger, “China, Russia Fear the US is Boxing Them In,” CNN, January 13, 2017, accessed April 10, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/13/asia/russia-china-thaad/>.

challenger's commitment and credibility. On the other hand, the response—including a lack of response—could indicate the recipient has misunderstood the nature of the challenger's actions, or the nature of the threat. Another possibility is that the recipient is reacting to one or more of the challenger's previous actions. The response could indicate a recognition that the challenger is responding to armed suasion, but could also indicate the challenger's threat perception has increased and it is moving into crisis response. Clearly, precise communication of threats and inducements is important to armed suasion, as is interpreting the response; however, content is just as important. Creating the right mix of threats and inducements presents a fifth challenge to armed suasion.

The Challenge of Creating the Right Mix of Threats and Inducements

In the United States, policy makers usually are the people who identify and convey initial demands to the target. Generic examples include demands that the target uphold a US-preferred status quo by refraining from behavior X, or accept a US-preferred change to a status quo by changing behavior Y. For military actions, it falls to military planners to generate the actions that sufficiently demonstrate the United States' commitment on the policy issue.⁵⁹ The threats must accurately reflect the stakes, cause the target genuine pause, and yet not be so overwhelming as to provide the threat recipient no viable option but to escalate.⁶⁰

Furthermore, some coercion theorists argue coercive strategies are too often heavy on sticks and light on carrots. The resultant strategy emphasizes the nature of the punishments while neglecting the positive inducements that create for the target a face-saving way to accede to US demands.⁶¹ Often, the inducement is nothing more than an explicit or implicit promise to

⁵⁹ JP 1-0, I-13; Cimbala, *Military Persuasion*, 2; Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 83-84.

⁶⁰ George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 274-275.

⁶¹ Freedman, *Deterrence*, 56-57;

withhold punishment than an independent offer of benefits that gives the competitor real negotiating space.⁶² A challenger can draw from any instrument of national power to create inducements—economic benefits like trade deals; diplomatic benefits like state visits or support on specific issues in international organizations; or military benefits like joint exercises or cooperative security missions. In an armed suasion planning construct, the default inducements will be military activities in order to give military commanders the greatest amount of control over their options.

Coercion literature makes clear that if coercion is to be successful, the planner must understand what the near peer competitor prioritizes and fears, what it values and is willing to risk everything for, and what it is willing to walk away from. This monograph further argues that armed suasion is ongoing—one must also consider second- and third-order effects. The mix of punishments and inducements conveyed to the near peer competitor should be calculated to allow the NPC to save face, while also minimizing the risk of inadvertently enabling the competitor greater freedom of action at some other place and time.

Clearly, deterrence theory literature illuminates a great deal about the characteristics, structures, and risks of non-conflict coercive actions, but the planner attempting to arrange these actions into a coherent armed suasion plan will be left with questions. Something this literature lacks is a clear discussion of the operational art and design that allow a planner to think through how develop a strategy or plan to implement armed suasion, particularly against a near peer competitor. This monograph next turns to US joint military doctrine to see how coercive strategies have been considered.

⁶² Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 74-75.

Literature Review: Coercive Strategy in Joint Doctrine

As with deterrence literature, the ways in which joint doctrine instructs the US military to think about armed conflict and the use of military power outside armed conflict reflect trends and changes in the United States' security environment. The first iteration of Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Unified and Joint Operations*, was released as a test publication in January 1990; as of January 2017, it is also the most recently updated.⁶³ In reviewing several iterations of JP 3-0, this monograph argues evolutions in joint doctrine reveal a Department of Defense increasingly concerned about promoting peace and stability, increasingly secure in its freedom of action, and increasingly aware of the unintended consequences emerging from that freedom. As a result, doctrinal discussions of countering near peer competitors fell out of favor, and considerations once specified for actions outside conflict merged with considerations for armed conflict. Interestingly, neither early or current joint doctrine discuss how to arrange non-combat operations and activities against a near peer competitor, but a comparison of early and current versions of JP 3-0 provides this monograph some inspiration for filling the gap.

A feature common to all iterations of JP 3-0 is to describe in some detail the different type of operations that are not large-scale combat operations and where they might generally be exercised on the conflict continuum. These include, but are not limited to, operations based on cooperation with partner nations—like military exercises and foreign assistance—and operations potentially countering competition from other nations, such as foreign internal defense and show of force operations. These operations serve as a starting point for planning armed suasion against

⁶³ This review of joint doctrine scopes itself to the iterations of JP 3-0 because that joint publication is updated most frequently, therefore presumably reflecting more nuance in the changes to doctrinal thinking. Including the 1990 test publication, JP 3-0 was updated in 1993, 1995, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2011, and most recently in January 2017. By contrast, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, was first published in 1995 and updated in 2006, with the current iteration published in 2011. For a discussion of changes to operations and planning doctrine, see Rick Rowlett et al., "The Way Ahead for Joint Operations and Planning Doctrine," *Joint Force Quarterly* 77 (2nd Quarter 2015), 141, accessed March 27, 2017, <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/581888/jfq-77-the-way-ahead-for-joint-operations-and-planning-doctrine/>.

a near peer competitor, yet one would need guiding principles by which to consider how to effectively arrange military activity.

Current joint doctrine provides one set of principles for joint operations; however, as Figure 2 illustrates, early joint doctrine envisioned a pair of overlapping principle sets: the principles of war and principles of operations other than war (OOTW). Earlier versions of JP 3-0 identified the principles of OOTW as objective, security, unity of effort, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Two of these—objective and security—overlap with the nine principles of war, which also include mass, maneuver, surprise, offensive, economy of force, simplicity, and unity of command.⁶⁴ The principles of war clearly assume that armed conflict is imminent or ongoing, and emphasize what the warfighter must do to defeat the opponent and bring the conflict to a successful conclusion. The principles of OOTW arguably reflect a desire to increase stability in the area where operations occur while preventing those operations from escalating to conflict.

Joint doctrine made this distinction until the 2006 iteration of JP 3-0.⁶⁵ Between the 2006 and 2017 iterations, these two sets of principles were increasingly collapsed into one, indistinguishable set: the principles of joint operations.⁶⁶ The 2017 version of JP 3-0 delivers its fullest discussion of these principles in Appendix A, acknowledging that while most of the principles apply to combat operations, “the principles do not apply equally in all joint operations.”⁶⁷ The argument for one set is compelling, reflecting as it almost certainly does the

⁶⁴ Unity of command and unity of effort are, effectively, the same principle. These versions of JP 3-0 noted that while the “principle of unity of command in war also applies to operations other than war,” military units might be supporting other US government agencies where the concept of ‘command arrangements’ or ‘command authorities’ differently understood and practiced, if at all. To compensate, these JPs recommend “commanders to seek an atmosphere of cooperation to achieve objectives by unity of effort.” See JP 3-0, 1995, V-2.

⁶⁵ JP 3-0, 2006, II-2.

⁶⁶ The term ‘operations other than war’ also disappeared from joint doctrine with the 2006 iteration; non-combat operations are captured in sections dedicated to military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence; or crisis response and limited contingency operations. See JP 3-0, 2006, iii-iv.

⁶⁷ JP 3-0, 2017, A-1.

United States' experience conducting stability operations in the aftermath of initial combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet this monograph sees value in parsing out which principles specifically apply to operations other than war because some of the principles of war—specifically mass, maneuver, surprise, and offensive—are counter-productive if not escalatory, as would be true with armed suasion.




Figure 2. Evolution to Principles of Joint Operations. Caroline Byorick. Data from Joint Publication (JP 3-0), *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), V-2; JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), II-2.

An interesting element of continuity throughout the publication history of JP 3-0 is its recognition of deterrence and compellence as two types of coercive action. The key example joint doctrine consistently provides is Operation EL DORADO CANYON. This “1986 operation to coerce Libya to conform with international laws against terrorism” has been featured in each iteration of JP 3-0 since 1993.⁶⁸ JP 3-0 uses this example of how an operation “may be conducted for the specific purpose of compelling or deterring an action.”⁶⁹ Joint doctrine defines deterrence

⁶⁸ JP 3-0, 1993, I-5; JP 3-0, 1995, I-4; JP 3-0, 2001, I-4; JP 3-0, 2006 (incorporating changes in 2008), I-10; JP 3-0, 2011, V-3; JP 3-0, 2017, V-7.

⁶⁹ JP 3-0, 1993, I-5; JP 3-0, 1995, I-4; JP 3-0, 2001, I-4; JP 3-0, 2006 (incorporating changes in 2008), I-10; JP 3-0, 2011, V-3; JP 3-0, 2017, V-7.

but not compelling action or compellence. Yet Operation EL DORADO CANYON, as described, does illustrate how compellence forces another state to take an action it does not want to take, as well as the often hybrid nature of deterrent and compellent actions.⁷⁰ The fact that JP 3-0 has used this example throughout its publication history strongly suggests this monograph's concept of armed suasion, with both deterrent and compellent actions, would readily fit into joint doctrine.

As with the review of the literature of coercive theory, a review of joint doctrine uncovers certain gaps in the guidance on planning and implementing coercive strategies. The review of different Joint Publication 3-0 iterations clearly indicates the Defense Department once devoted more discussion to the principles and planning considerations that govern operations other than war. Yet even these earlier versions of JP 3-0 provide little guidance in thinking about how one would arrange non-combat operations against near peer competitors in order to remain consistent with the principles of operations other than war. However, the body of literature and joint doctrine provide the elements that allow this monograph to hypothesize a new approach to countering near peer competition—the armed suasion planning construct.

Armed Suasion in the 21st Century—A Hypothesis

A common feature to every US national security strategy since at least 1991 is the link between US freedom of action abroad to maintain US security at home.⁷¹ However, unlike any

⁷⁰ Outside this example, joint doctrine says about compelling: "Coercion generates effects through the application of force (to include the threat of force) to compel a competitor or prevent our being compelled." However, compellence and deterrence are both types of coercion, and one is still left wondering what it means to be compelled. Unlike "deterrence," joint doctrine does not appear to have a codified term that describes 'compelling action' as the threat or application of military force to make a target *take* an action by presenting a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction that raises the cost of the anticipated *inaction* beyond the perceived benefits. For the reference, see Joint Publication (JP) 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), I-13.

⁷¹ This monograph reviewed National Security Strategies published between 1991 and 2015, available at the National Security Strategy Archive, <http://nssarchive.us>. See "1991 National Security Strategy," National Security Strategy Archive, 1, accessed April 12, 2017; "1993 National Security Strategy," National Security Strategy Archive, 2, accessed April 12, 2017; "1994 National Security Strategy," National Security Strategy Archive, 1-2, accessed April 12, 2017; "1995 National Security Strategy," National Security Strategy Archive, 7-8, accessed April 12, 2017; "1996 National Security

other class of potential opponents the United States might face, near peer competitors possess sufficient conventional and strategy military capabilities to hinder the United States' pursuit of its security interests. Furthermore, US military options to counter near peer competitors (NPCs) grow fewer and riskier as tensions increase. While planning for a spectrum of contingencies is important, fighting and winning armed conflict with a NPC risks a cost that the US public might be reluctant to pay. The United States used coercive strategies during the Cold War to counter the Soviet Union—a peer competitor; however, current joint doctrine does not provide guidance on how to select and implement a coercive strategy today. The challenge facing the Department of Defense echoes past challenges: figuring out how to effectively use its military power outside conflict to expand US freedom of action while managing the risk of unintended escalation.

This monograph hypothesizes that armed suasion can address a gap in joint doctrine, allowing military commanders to successfully advance US security strategies in the face of near peer competition. Armed suasion as a coercive strategy consists of two components. The first is the armed suasion planning construct, which advocates the arrangement of both types of coercive military actions—deterrents and compellents—as well as military inducements, to achieve three complementary goals. First, the armed suasion planning construct builds, maintains, or regains credibility. Second, it shapes near peer competitor decision making. Third, it manages the risk of unintended escalation to conflict.

The armed suasion planning construct supplies the what, but current doctrine also has gaps in providing the how—the principles that guide a planning staff in thinking about how to successfully arrange these deterring, compelling, and inducing military actions. The principles of

Strategy,” National Security Strategy Archive, 1-3, accessed April 12, 2017; “1997 National Security Strategy,” National Security Strategy Archive, accessed April 12, 2017; “1998 National Security Strategy,” National Security Strategy Archive, iii, accessed April 12, 2017; “1999 National Security Strategy,” National Security Strategy Archive, 1-3, accessed April 12, 2017; “2000 National Security Strategy,” National Security Strategy Archive, accessed April 12, 2017; “2002 National Security Strategy,” National Security Strategy Archive, 1-2, accessed April 12, 2017; “2006 National Security Strategy,” National Security Strategy Archive, 1, accessed April 12, 2017; “2010 National Security Strategy,” National Security Strategy Archive, 1-2, accessed April 12, 2017; “2015 National Security Strategy,” National Security Strategy Archive, 1-2, accessed April 12, 2017.

joint operations offer an unsatisfying mix of principles, some of which are useful or neutral; and some of which are counterproductive or escalatory—specifically mass, maneuver, surprise, and offensive. Given the challenges endemic to any coercive strategy, a planning staff would be well served with a set of principles tailored to provide the greatest opportunity for success.

Accordingly, armed suasion requires a second feature—a specific set of guidelines this monograph calls the principles of armed suasion: objective, unity of effort, restraint, perseverance, clarity, and awareness. The principles of armed suasion have as their primary foundation the principles of operations other than war, and include two new principles to better address the challenges identified by coercion theorists. Figure 3 depicts the armed suasion planning construct and principles of armed suasion. A brief description of each principle illustrates their value in guiding the arrangement of actions in an armed suasion construct.




Figure 3. Armed Suasion on a Conflict Continuum. Caroline Byorick. Data from Joint Publication (JP 3-0), *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), V-2; JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), II-2; JP 3-0, 2017, VI-2.

Objective

Every action conducted in armed suasion, as in armed conflict, should move the United States closer to a desired objective. As with conflict, armed suasion requires the planner to

identify what conditions “constitute success,” to quote the 1995 version of JP 3-0.⁷² The principle of objective applies to all three goals of armed suasion.

Clarity

A new principle proposed by this monograph, clarity emphasizes communication to the NPC. Clarity encourages the planning staff to evaluate how clearly a selected military action conveys the intended message. The principle of clarity helps the planning staff select actions that build credibility. In conjunction with other principles of armed suasion, clarity also helps the staff select the most appropriate time and space for actions that may heighten the risk of unintended escalation.⁷³

Unity of Effort

Pre-2006 versions of JP 3-0 stated that the principle of unity of command exists outside armed conflict, but is more difficult to obtain.⁷⁴ In armed suasion, unity of effort is a reminder that when all military actions are communications, synchronizing the efforts of Combatant Commands and subordinate component commands is vitally important. The principle of unity of effort is especially important to managing the risk of unintended escalation.

Restraint:

Currently a principle of joint operations, JP 3-0 states the “purpose of restraint is to prevent the unnecessary use of force.”⁷⁵ Pre-2006 versions of JP 3-0 use different language that is

⁷² JP 3-0, 1995, V-2.

⁷³ Everett C. Dolman has a nice line about the value of clarity: “The greater the flows of accurate information, the more plausible options are made plain, and the greater likelihood there is for meaningful choice.” See Everett C. Dolman, *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age* (New York: Frank Cass, 2005), 131.

⁷⁴ For example, see JP 3-0, 1995, V-2.

⁷⁵ JP 3-0, 2017, A-3.

more appropriate to armed suasion: “Apply appropriate military capability prudently.”⁷⁶ Armed suasion attempts to remain within the competition zone; the principle of restraint is valuable for managing the risk of unintended escalation.

Perseverance:

The 2001 version of JP 3-0 observes that “underlying causes of confrontation and conflict rarely have a clear beginning or a decisive resolution.”⁷⁷ The current JP 3-0, as its predecessors do, describes perseverance as “preparation for measured, protracted military operations in pursuit of national objectives.”⁷⁸ Perseverance is the principle of armed suasion that recognizes building credibility and shaping the decision-making process of a determined NPC both take time.

Awareness:

The second new principle proposed by this monograph, awareness reminds the planner that his or her planning efforts take place simultaneously with other US government actions, both military and non-military. Awareness prompts the planner to consider how the individual and cumulative effects of past US actions weigh on actions planned for the future. Awareness also encourages the planner to consider the non-US factors that drive NPC decision-making when the planner is arranging military activities. This principle applies to all three goals of armed suasion.

Hypothesis Test

To test the hypothesis, this monograph provides a case study to examine how its two major features—the armed suasion planning construct and the principles of armed suasion—would function in a real-world scenario. The monograph uses a contemporary security issue, the Chinese territorial disputes in the South China Sea, as described in the US Department of

⁷⁶ JP 3-0, 1995, V-3.

⁷⁷ JP 3-0, 2001, V-3.

⁷⁸ JP 3-0, 2017, A-4.

Defense's Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2016. In the first part of the hypothesis test, the case study will examine the guidance joint doctrine currently provides for countering an opponent in the competition zone, and illustrate how the armed suasion planning construct can address the gaps in this doctrine.

The second part of the hypothesis test will use the case study to examine how armed suasion activities might be implemented using the principles of joint operations, and then by using this monograph's proposed principles of armed suasion. In doing so, this monograph will demonstrate the how an armed suasion planning construct, guided by a different set of principles than those of joint operations, can address a gap in joint doctrine with regards to countering near peer competitors.

Scenario: Chinese Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea

In the *Annual Report*, the US Department of Defense noted that the People's Republic of China had ongoing territorial disputes in several areas, to include in the South China Seas.⁷⁹ Defense Secretary Jim Mattis reiterated the Department's concern in February 2017, noting China's "increasingly confrontational behavior" South China Seas.⁸⁰ As the *Annual Report* notes, Chinese "land reclamation on features in the Spratly Islands...enhanced the appearance of China's ability to exercise control over disputed areas in the South China Sea, raised tensions in the South China Sea, and caused concern over China's long-term intentions."⁸¹ Figure 4, from the

⁷⁹ US Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2016* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), 7, accessed April 13, 2017, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Publications>.

⁸⁰ Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, "Joint Press Briefing by Secretary Mattis and Minister Inada in Tokyo, Japan," Department of Defense News Transcript, accessed March 23, 2017, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1071436/joint-press-briefing-by-secretary-mattis-and-minister-inada-in-tokyo-japan>.

⁸¹ Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress*, 7.

Annual Report, depicts the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Infrastructure development associated with some of the land reclamation efforts in the Spratly Islands will “include harbors, communications and surveillance systems, logistics facilities” as well as three airfields on Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef, respectively.⁸²




Figure 4. Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea. *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016) 10.

The first major premise of this monograph’s hypothesis is that joint doctrine lacks detailed guidance on countering near peer competition—a gap an armed suasion construct could fill. Because China calibrates its military and non-military actions to “increase its effective control over disputed areas and avoid escalation to military conflict,” Chinese confrontation in the South China Sea almost certainly falls into the competition zone of joint doctrine’s conflict continuum (See Figure 1 for reference).⁸³ According to doctrine, the range of military operations in the competition zone include security cooperation and deterrence, activities that readily lend

⁸² Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress*, 13-19.

⁸³ Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress*, 13.

themselves to an armed suasion planning construct.⁸⁴ JP 3-0 notes that “effective deterrence requires a theater campaign plan (TCP),” indicating that the relevant Combatant Commander—US Pacific Command (USPACOM)—should use his or her TCP as the primary vehicle for countering Chinese confrontation. JP 3-0 also says, “The TCP’s long-term and persistent and preventative activities are intended to identify and deter, counter, or otherwise mitigate an adversary’s actions before escalation to combat,” then refers the reader to Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Planning*, for more information.⁸⁵ JP 5-0—which was published in 2011—states TCPs should “focus on the command’s steady-state activities,” listed above, and that TCP is where “detailed execution of the theater strategy” occurs.⁸⁶

The gap in joint doctrine is evident: JP 3-0 and JP 5-0 both describe what a TCP should do but neither provides details on the how. Both lack guidance on the principles or planning considerations a military planner needs in order to build an adversary-focused, non-escalatory TCP. The 2017 JP 3-0 comes closest, with a discussion of deterrence that addresses the deterrent opportunity in certain types of actions, and the associated risk, specifically with regards to forward presence. Joint doctrine here recognizes the importance of credibility, as well as the risk of escalation that comes with implementing coercive actions, but does not describe how a planning team’s careful calculation should translate into arranging the action to prevent escalation:

The sustained presence of strong, capable forces is the most visible sign of US commitment to allies and adversaries alike... Carefully calculated forward presence, clearly signaled to adversaries as non-aggressive, can prevent escalation, but poorly calculated or poorly signaled increases in forward presence can lead to counter-productive countermeasures and escalation.

⁸⁴ JP 3-0, 2017, VI-1—V-4.

⁸⁵ JP 3-0, 2017, V-6

⁸⁶ Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), II-3—II-4; II-7.

Additionally, the emphasis on deterrence creates a predicament. The structure of pure, or passive, deterrence results in the planning staff accepting the status quo China has created through its confrontational behavior; deterrence in this example seeks to only prevent further predation. There is nothing inherently wrong with such a choice but, as previously discussed, nations can also use compellent or hybrid deterrent-compellent threats. If these threats are labeled deterrence, but are actually compellent in seeking to change the status quo, the planning staff may not understand how implement the threat, or what it attempts to achieve. Because those coercive actions have different structures, using a compellent threat for deterrence could cause the United States to lose credibility, or could send an ambiguous message that escalates tension.

A hypothetical use of forward presence illustrates the difference. If USPACOM signaled an intent to increase the number of long-range, precision guided munitions (PGM) available in prepositioned stocks, such an action would be standard deterrence. If Chinese leadership believe the commitment is credible, they decline further island building. The threat is implicit; a Chinese decision to be deterred is implicit, too. Beijing can come up with any beneficial narrative to explain why China is no longer island building. Imagine instead USPACOM published a press release stating it would move PGMs into theater until China undertook some kind of dismantlement on one or more contested islands. No matter how the action is labeled, in actuality it is not deterrence but compellence. In this variant, because the United States acts first to coerce a change to the status quo, two implications follow.

First, tying US commitment to Chinese action, rather than inaction, puts US credibility at stake in a much more visible way. If China does not act, the United States must increase its compellent pressure. Second, the public demand to change behavior forces Chinese leadership to weigh the credibility it loses domestically and around the region in acquiescing to this demand. If Beijing calculates that the United States will not increase compellent pressure, it has little incentive to comply. Paradoxically, if Beijing calculates the United States is committed to

increasing compellent pressure, it could escalate its own behavior out of genuine concern, coercive posturing, or both.

In contrast to a theater campaign plan, or the early phases of a joint combat operation, an armed suasion planning construct specifically identifies and allows for deterrence or compellence, as the situation requires. This planning construct explains to a military planner the difference between deterrence and compellence, and how an action can shift from one form of coercion to the other based on the operational environment. The three goals of the armed suasion planning construct also create a way for the planning staff to bin actions by intended effect: building credibility, shaping NPC decisions, and/or managing risk.

For example, in the case of Chinese land reclamation and infrastructure on disputed South China Sea territories, freedom of navigation (FON) missions would be a deterrent if the United States accepts China's progress as the status quo and is attempting to shape Chinese decision-making to prevent further reclamation. Those same freedom of navigation missions would be a compellent if the military commander explicitly communicated the contingent link between the conduct and duration of those missions and a requirement for China to change its behavior. The goal in this context might be to demonstrate US commitment and thus build credibility. The desired change would be dependent on US national policy, but could hypothetically range from legal agreements allowing regional claimants to use the infrastructure to entirely dismantling the infrastructure.

Whether using activities in a deterrent, compellent, or hybrid capacity, the armed suasion planning construct also instructs the military planner to identify a positive military inducement and to clearly communicate to China that both the positive and negative activities are linked to China's decision making regarding the South China Sea. Returning to the example of forward presence, clearly articulating positive military inducements along with the compellent threat would give China a path by which to accede to the demand while maintaining domestic credibility. Examples of positive military inducements might be joint counter-piracy or

counterterrorism missions, joint military exercises, or natural disaster recovery training. However, as with the coercive activities, the nature of the inducement is context-dependent, and should focus on actions that the near peer competitor finds alluring, but that don't undermine US national policies. If military inducements are not feasible, the Combatant Commander would need to coordinate with other US government agencies to identify a non-military inducement that meets the requirements.

The second major premise of this monograph's hypothesis is that the principles by which one plans armed suasion are critical to effectively building credibility, shaping NPC decision-making, and managing risk of unintended escalation. Joint doctrine offers the military planner one set of principles—the twelve principles of joint operations. As previously noted, four of these—mass, maneuver, surprise, and offensive—are counterproductive or escalatory. By contrast, the principles tailored to armed suasion—objective, clarity, unity of effort, restraint, perseverance, and awareness—reflect the need in any coercive strategy to clearly communicate intent to the competitor. They also reflect the idea that—at minimum—a planner must account in his or her planning for actions being undertaken by the subordinate and adjacent commands.

Two common US military actions in the South and East China Seas—FON missions and air flights through Chinese claimed air defense identification zones (ADIZ)—present an opportunity to test the second premise. If one were to use mass and surprise to guide the planning of a FON or ADIZ flight, a plan might include having a naval carrier strike group make an unannounced pass through the South China Sea simultaneously with a similarly unannounced Air Force B-1 bomber flight through China's claimed ADIZ in the international air space near South Korea.⁸⁷ These missions, arranged and executed this way, would clearly demonstrate the

⁸⁷ Coincidentally, CNN reported Air Force B-1 bombers conducted an ADIZ flight on Sunday, March 19, 2017, though it is not clear from the news report whether the flight was announced ahead of time. See Ryan Browne, "Chinese officials warned US bomber during 'routine' East China Sea flyover," CNN, March 23, 2017, accessed March 24, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/22/politics/china-us-aircraft-warned/>.

credibility of US commitment and capability to maintain US and allied freedom of action in international space China claims as its own. However, the consequences of those missions might easily escalate tensions in an undesirable way.

With a near peer competitor, the effort to coerce must be balanced with the requirement to manage tension. A planning staff might substitute surprise for clarity, clearly articulating to the NPC the nature of the action and its intended purpose. In doing so, the staff mitigates the risk of triggering a Chinese threat response. Similarly, the staff might substitute mass for restraint to achieve several effects. Managing the risk of unintended escalation is an obvious effect, but restraint also works to build credibility by allowing the United States to demonstrate commitment incrementally, while also retaining United States options for increasing pressure later—these effects demonstrate the value of perseverance.

As hypothesized, one must also be aware of military actions adjacent commands are implementing to counter threats unrelated to near peer competition, as the earlier THAAD example demonstrates. A military planner implementing armed suasion against China in the South China Sea would be aware that the United States has deployed THAAD capability to South Korea to counter the North Korea missile threat. That military planner would also recognize Beijing has voiced consistent opposition to the presence of THAAD as detrimental to China's stability. Accurately interpreting whether Beijing's opposition to actions outside the planner's command is genuine, or a convenient talking point, would impact the planner's choices about how to implement armed suasion actions. Genuine concern might call for a slower tempo of action, or a different mix of coercive actions and inducements; convenient talking points might warrant calling the bluff and closely monitoring the Chinese response.

Recommendations for Future Use

The armed suasion planning construct outlined here provides planners a way to think about the problem; however, the specific military actions selected will be dependent on the

operational environment. Operational design as described by joint doctrine provides the general guidance necessary, including an assessment of the operational environment, near peer competitor motivations and capabilities, US policy objectives, US allies' actions, and actions other US governmental departments are taking. Nonetheless, because doctrine provides little guidance specifically on developing and implementing a plan for armed suasion, the following questions, asked on a regular basis, can provide a mental azimuth check:

Q: Is the NPC considering changing the United States' preferred status quo or has the NPC already changed it?

Q: What US policy message do US military actions or operations communicate?

Q: Does the planned US military threat or action defend the status quo (if/then structure) or attempt to change it (acting until structure)?

Q: If the US threat or action is a compellent, what secondary actions should be planned if the NPC does not comply with the compellent (what next structure)?

Q: Did the NPC understand the communication?

Q: What is the worst way in which the NPC could misinterpret the action?

Q: Is the perceived NPC (re)acting to the Combatant Command's most recent threat or action? Might it actually be reacting to an earlier threat or action?

Q: How many US military actions or operations are under way right now that could in any way affect the NPC?

Q: Might the perceived NPC (re)action be in response to an action taken by other Defense Department elements, particularly a unified command or Service?

Q: What military actions is the United States using to address other threats? Does the NPC interpret those actions as communicating to the NPC? If so, what might the perceived message be?

Conclusion

The nature of peer and near peer competition is such that the potential risks of confrontation at the high-end of the conflict continuum trickle down, constricting US military freedom of action in the competition zone. Conflict avoidance is an adequate strategy but limits the United States' ability to fully use its military power to support strategic objectives. Currently, joint doctrine acknowledges the need to counter opponents in the competition zone, but provides little guidance on how to do so successfully while managing the risk of unintended escalation.

This monograph hypothesizes that armed suasion can address the gap in joint doctrine. An armed suasion planning construct would allow military commanders to arrange deterring, compelling, and inducing military actions in order to build, maintain, or regain credibility; shape near peer competitor decision making; and manage the risk of unintended escalation to conflict. Navigating time, space, and purpose in the competition zone requires a tailored set of principles to guide US military planners to think about and plan for armed suasion differently than for armed conflict. The principles of armed suasion—objective, clarity, unity of effort, restraint, perseverance, and awareness—balance building credibility and shaping a near peer competitor's decision-making with managing the risk of unintended escalation.

In adapting theorist Edward Luttwak's concept of armed suasion for the Department of Defense's 21st century security challenges, this monograph attempts to acknowledge the concerns raised by different schools of coercive thought.⁸⁸ The concept explicitly recognizes that using both deterrent and compellent actions provides a military commander the greatest number of options, a characteristic it shares with Tom Schelling.⁸⁹ The concept makes clear that what makes a threat deterrent or compellent is not the action but the context, creating a spectrum of coercion that can generate additional risk for military planners unaware of the structural differences

⁸⁸ Luttwak, *Strategy*, 218.

⁸⁹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 70-71; Freedman, *Deterrence*, 109.

between deterrent, compellent, and hybrid threats. The use of inducements acknowledges the concerns of Alexander George, and recognizes risks common to any coercive strategy as identified by multiple theorists, including Robert Jervis, Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein.⁹⁰

As Robert Jervis notes in *Psychology and Deterrence*, "Complex and sophisticated strategies of coercion usually fail because they make excessive demands on the state's ability to understand its environment and to coordinate its policy instruments."⁹¹ The armed suasion planning construct, with its singular focus on military action, was conceived with this limitation in mind. A military commander can implement armed suasion without active participation and collaboration from other departments. While whole-of-government synchronization would greatly enhance the effects, the approach requires, at minimum, awareness of what activities other departments are undertaking, what those actions might communicate to the NPC, and how the DOD should balance its own activities to maintain the just-enough level of coercion that manages the risk of escalation.

One might think from reading this monograph that a plan for armed suasion will be difficult to build. It will be—armed suasion is a constant communication of US national policy goals to a near peer competitor through US military power. The military planner attempts to match military action to a US policy goal while anticipating, then monitoring the competitor's response. When one imagines the alternatives, however—to take an ad hoc approach to non-conflict coercion or do nothing but react to the near peer competitor's behaviors—armed suasion represents an opportunity to seize and retain the initiative.

As with armed conflict, an armed suasion plan will change in response to interaction with the environment and the near peer competitor. The value of planned armed suasion over ad hoc efforts is that a formal plan creates a forcing function to encourage careful thought and iterations

⁹⁰ George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 272-275; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence*, 2-5; Freedman, *Deterrence*, 56.

⁹¹ Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence*, 7.

of plans, and to ensure that disparate actions across domains still work coherently to achieve the policy objective while keeping the United States within an acceptable range of actions in relation to a near peer competitor.

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